Letter - NHS Database

NHS Database

Dear Sir,
I write to congratulate you on your reporter Duncan Leatherdale's article in last week’s edition, which corrected, to some extent, the one-sided presentation of the new NHS database in the Mercury 3 weeks ago.
I am the unnamed “upper dale resident” quoted in the article, but I had no cause, nor did I request, to remain anonymous. I have no involvement with the NHS database, except as a potential record in it, nor do I wish to contradict any GP’s advice to their patients.
However, I feel very strongly about the encroaching “database state” which we have in this country and I am highly sceptical of the Government’s ability to deliver reliable and secure IT projects. I seek only to help people inform themselves fully about the risks and benefits of allowing their personal information to be computerised by the state.
The NHS database itself is probably the worst example of many government IT schemes which have been complete disasters. Originally expected to cost £2.3 billion over three years, in June 2006 the total cost of the NHS National Programme for IT was estimated by the National Audit Office to be £12.4bn over 10 years.
Prof Ross Anderson, a security expert at Cambridge University, said there was no guarantee that only NHS staff treating someone could access their records. Hundreds of thousands of health service personnel would have a swipecard to enter the system. "You just can't keep a secret if 300,000 people have access to it”.
This government has a truly unenviable record for handling data. In 2007: HM Revenue & Customs lost 2 CDs containing unencrypted child benefit records for 25 million people (it is generally accepted that this is the biggest single loss of personal data in the world to date); HM Revenue & Customs lost the pension policy details of 15,000 customers; the Department of Work and Pensions lost the personal financial details of 40,000 housing benefit claimants; the DVLA lost the details of 6,000 drivers from Northern Ireland; the DVLA lost the details of 3 million candidates for the driving theory test.
In addition to the risk of loss or unauthorised access, your uploaded medical data will be available, without your knowledge or consent, to thousands of non–clinical health administrators, as well as private commercial companies (who will then disseminate the information further) and academic organisations, under what is known as Secondary Use Services. There are serious concerns about the use of this data without explicit patient consent, and it is very likely to be unlawful.
Although Dr Pindolia is quoted as saying “the records will mean quicker and safer access for people to medicine when not dealing with their regular GP”, researchers reviewing the project for the Department of Health have found examples where the database failed to indicate allergies or adverse reactions to drugs, and listed medication that the patient wasn’t taking. It also indicated false allergies or adverse reactions to drugs. Such errors could lead to patients being given inappropriate medication or suffering severe reactions, which in the worse cases can be fatal.
If, due to your medical history, you still feel that it would be important for doctors to have information urgently, you could wear a bracelet/necklet (e.g. MedicAlert, SOS Talisman, Alert card, Zaptag). Also, GP computer systems can easily print out a short summary of important and relevant medical information for any of the practice's patients in a few seconds. The printout is usually on an A4 piece of paper, and you would need to ask your GP in person for this. Medical staff are trained to check personal effects for such information when patients are admitted in an emergency.
To opt-out of automatic inclusion of your personal and medical data on this unreliable and insecure system, ask your GP, download the form from http://www.nhscarerecords.nhs.uk/options/optoutform.pdf or call 0845 603 8510.
Yours faithfully,
Ian Cook